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0N NOVEMBER 11, 1988, the Department of Trans-
portation announced a drug testing program which
will subject four million private sector workers to
mandatory random urinalysis.' The program is the first
attempt by a federal agency to require random testing of
non-government employees. It represents the second
level of the government's response to President Reagan's
Drug Free America crusade.' The Department of Trans-
portation program includes the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration's (FAA) "Anti-Drug Program for Personnel
Engaged in Specified Aviation Activities."' The FAA pro-
gram will require mandatory random urinalysis for a ma-
jority of commercial aviation employees.5
This comment will address the probable constitutional
challenges to the FAA regulations. The first section
I See N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
2 Id. at 16, col. 5. The program will require testing of an estimated four million
private sector workers at an expected cost of two billion dollars over the next 10
years. Id. at 1, col. 4, 16, col. 5.
:1 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986) (initiating drug test-
ing procedures in the Executive Branch).
I Final Rule, Anti-Drug Program for Personnel Engaged in Specified Aviation
Activities, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,024 (1988) [hereinafter FR, Anti-Drug Program] (codi-
fied at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 121 and 135); see infra notes 53-111 and accompa-
nying text.
I FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,024; see infra notes 63-68 and ac-
companying text.
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presents a brief history of drug testing in aviation.6 The
second section outlines the FAA regulations and the con-
stitutional issues addressed in the comments accompany-
ing the announcement of the FAA program.7 Although
drug testing has become an increasingly common prac-
tice, the Supreme Court has only recently ruled on the
constitutional limits on drug testing by the government.
Last term the Court granted certiorari and heard argu-
ment on two cases addressing the issue in order to resolve
a split between the circuits. 8 Its decisions establishing
constitutional standards for permissible mandatory drug
testing were issued in March, 1989.1 Unfortunately,
neither of the cases before the Supreme Court addressed
random drug testing or testing in the aviation industry.10
The third section of the comment analyzes the "special
needs" test used by the Court in reviewing those drug
testing programs and compares the challenged programs
to the FAA tests." This analysis will concentrate on the
standard adopted by the Supreme Court and how it might
be applied to the FAA tests. 12
Mandatory drug tests for civilian aviation personnel
mandated by the Department of Defense and the Depart-
ment of Transportation have been challenged in the
courts. 13 Several cases addressing this issue were recently
1 See infra notes 20-52 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 53-111 and accompanying text.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding mandatory post-accident urinalysis of railroad employees unconstitu-
tional) [hereinafter Burnley I], rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) ; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding Customs Service drug testing plan for new
and transferring employees in sensitive positions not unconstitutional) [hereinaf-
ter Von Raab 1] afd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)
[hereinafter Von Raab II]; see generally Neal, Mandatoy Drug Testing, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1, 1988, at 58 (discussing Burnley I and Von Raab I).
Von Raab H, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989); Skinner, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
See Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 575; Von Raab 1, 816 F.2d at 170.
See infra notes 110-225 and accompanying text.
"- See infra note 166. The Ninth and Fifth Circuits relied on different tests to
analyze the reasonableness of the drug testing programs. The Supreme Court
affirmed the analysis relied on by the Fifth Circuit.
" National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.
consolidated and heard by the D.C. Circuit. 14 Part four
examines this decision for issues specific to aviation which
may not have been raised in the two cases before the
Supreme Court. 1 5 In September, 1989 the Ninth Circuit
heard oral arguments in a suit brought by several labor
groups representing aviation industry personnel.' 6 That
case, Bluestein v. Skinner,' 7 will likely be the vehicle with
which the constitutionality of the FAA testing program is
ultimately challenged. The final section of this comment
will briefly discuss the issues raised by the plaintiffs in
Bluestein,' 8 and conclude with an analysis of various factors
which must be incorporated in a "special needs" analysis
of the FAA drug testing program.19
I. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF DRUG TESTING IN
AVIATION
The safety concerns raised by drug and alcohol abuse
impact at least three areas of commercial airline transpor-
tation.20 Pilot impairment poses the most obvious threat.
Any reduction in the pilot's capacity to safely operate a
commercial airliner endangers the lives and safety of its
crew and passengers. 2 ' Maintenance and repair errors by
mechanics and other pre- and post-flight support person-
1987) (testing of civilian Department of Defense employees); National Fed'n of
Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C. 1988); Mullholland v. De-
partment of the Army, 660 F. Supp. 1565 (E.D. Va. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in
part and remanded by National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (all testing civilian Department of Defense employees); see infra
note 226 and accompanying text.
Cheney, 884 F.2d at 603.
See infra notes 226-244 and accompanying text.
DiNunno, Drng Testing Looms Closer, AIRLINE PILOT, Nov. 1989, at 11.
17 No. 88-7503 (9th Cir. argued Sept. 15, 1989).
See infra notes 245-263 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 264-281 and accompanying text.
See 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (1I)(a)-(h) (1989) (listing flight crewmembers,
flight attendants, flight and ground instruction personnel, flight testing person-
nel, dispatchers, maintenance personnel, security personnel and air traffic con-
trollers as employees who must be tested).
,, National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. 46, 54 (D.D.C.
1988), afld in part, vacated in part and remanded by National Fed'n of Fed. Employees
v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
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nel resulting from drug or alcohol impairment also di-
rectly threaten air safety.22 In addition, the actions of
government employees, such as air traffic controllers, di-
rectly affect the safety of air travel.23 Although addressed
last, the potential for catastrophe resulting from errors by
controllers is arguably the greatest. 24
Prior to the promulgation of the drug program, the
dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by aviation personnel
were addressed solely by general statutory prohibition.25
Certificate holders were not allowed to participate as
crewmembers while under the influence of alcohol or
drugs which would adversely affect their capabilities.26
Any involvement in drug trafficking was grounds for sus-
pension, revocation or denial of a certificate. 7 In addi-
tion, refusal to submit to a blood alcohol percentage test
when requested by a law enforcement officer was also
grounds for revocation or suspension of a certificate.28
Concerns about the danger of drug and alcohol abuse
in the aviation industry will undoubtedly lead to drug test-
ing of employees in some form. 29 Drug testing in the
commercial aviation industry will occur in one of two
ways. Either the mandated FAA testing will be affirmed or
drug testing in some form will be initiated by employers.3
If FAA-mandated drug testing is found to be a govern-
ment action, it must conform to constitutional guide-
22 Id.
2.1 See National Air Traffic Controllers v. Burnley, 700 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
24 Id.
2 Alcohol or Drugs, 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 (1989); Carriage of Narcotic Drugs, Ma-
rihuana, and Depressant or Stimulant Drugs or Substances, id. § 91.12. For a dis-
cussion of the prior statutory scheme, see Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Control of Drug and Alcohol Use of Personnel Engaged in Commer-
cial and GeneralAviation Activities, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,432 (1986).
'-,i 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 (1989).
.7 Id. § 91.12.
See id. § 91.11.
"9 See generally FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,025 (Discussion of
Comments-General Overview). The entire spectrum of commentors to the NPRM
acknowledged the need to keep the commercial aviation workplace drug free. Id.
" See id. The discussion includes comments from several employers on their
current anti-drug programs. Id.
lines.3 1  Employer initiated testing must be analyzed
within the scope of appropriate collective bargaining
agreements.32
Several recent cases have considered whether an em-
ployer may institute a drug testing procedure under a col-
lective bargaining agreement that generally prohibits
alcohol and drug abuse. 3 These cases involve both the
railroad and aviation industries. The critical issue in all of
these decisions has been whether the dispute was a "ma-
jor" or "minor" dispute under the Railroad Labor Act. 4
The primary distinction between these two terms is that
while minor disputes are subject to binding arbitration,
during a major dispute employees may turn to courts to
enforce the status quo during the negotiating period. 5
The most recent decisions on drug testing by common
carriers suggest that the inclusion of some drug testing
programs is a minor dispute. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Railway Labor Executives Association36 the Supreme Court
held that a dispute regarding the inclusion of periodic
drug tests in physical examinations was a minor dispute. 7
More recently, the Fifth Circuit reheard and vacated a de-
cision which enjoined Southwest Airlines from initiating a
drug testing program.38 As noted by the dissenting opin-
ion in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Southwest Air-
lines Co., 39 several aspects of the Southwest plan are
:- See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
.... See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
2477 (1989); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines Co., 875 F.2d
1129 (5th Cir. 1989); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Burlington R.R., 838
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3207 (1989); Brotherhood of Main-
tenance of Way Employees v. Burlington R.R., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
34 See Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2479-82. The Court explained the statutory
basis for the distinction, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152 Seventh, 156 (1982), and the historical
development of their analysis. Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2479-82.
15 Id. at 2480-81.
:m; 109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989).
-7 Id. at 2489. The court stated that a dispute is minor when the proposed
change is "arguably justified" by the express terms of the contract or by implica-
tion in light of past practice. Id. at 2484-85.
Southwest Airlines, 875 F.2d at 1129.
Id.
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incorporated in the FAA testing program, and any arbitra-
tion on those elements will be pre-empted if the FAA pro-
gram is upheld.40
Government directed drug testing has been addressed
by several circuits and the varying results have addressed
numerous constitutional issues. 4' The majority of these
cases consider possible violations of the protections
granted by the fourth amendment (search and seizure),
fourteenth amendment (due process), fifth amendment
(self-incrimination), and fundamental and penumbral
rights of privacy.42 Although no current circuit level case
directly addresses the airline industry, courts have consid-
ered testing for jockeys,43 railroad workers,44 city bus
drivers,45 prison employees, 46 and customs inspectors. 47
The Supreme Court decided two of these cases last term,
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,48 and Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Association. 49
Government regulation is the most likely vehicle for
mandatory drug testing in the commercial aviation indus-
try. The FAA recently concluded formal rulemaking pro-
cedures which create a mandatory drug testing program
for the commercial aviation industry. 50 These rules are
similar in format and purpose to the Federal Railroad Ad-
Id. at 1137-38 n.3, 1153 n.31.
Von Raab 1, 816 F.2d 170 and National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Wein-
berger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th
Cir. 1987); Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
" See Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 575; Von Raab 1, 816 F.2d at 174. See generally Curran,
Compulsory Drug Testing: The Legal Barriers, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 318 (1987).
... Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.) (allowing the New Jersey Rac-
ing Commission to require jockeys to submit to random breath and urine tests),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
.. Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 575.
Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1264.
Hunter, 809 F.2d at 1302 (allowing random urinalysis tests for Department of
Corrections employees who have regular contact with inmates in medium and
maximum security prisons).
.7 Von Raab 1, 816 F.2d at 170.
4. 109 S. Ct. at 1384.
"t 109 S. Ct. at 1402.
1"' FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,024.
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ministration (FRA) regulations which were challenged in
Skinner. 5 ' An analysis of the issues raised in that decision
may provide an indication of the future challenges to the
FAA regulations.52
II. ANTI-DRUG PROGRAM PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN
SPECIFIED AVIATION ACTIVITIES
The FAA drug program began with an Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on December 9,
1986. 53 This was followed by a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) on March 14, 1988. 54 The NPRM
discussed the main issues addressed by the final rule. 55
The NPRM also emphasized the growing national drug
problem, proposed substances and personnel to be
tested, and outlined the mechanics and goals of the pro-
56gram. Open meetings were held in several locations to
give the public an opportunity to comment.
The FAA program was announced on November 1,
1988.58 It incorporated several changes which resulted
from industry comments and judicial decisions that oc-
curred during the comment period. 59 This section briefly
outlines the program, concentrating on the who, how,
F-1 09 S. Ct. at 1408-10; see Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, 49 C.F.R.
§§ 219.1 -.505 (1988).
52 See infra notes 122-216 and accompanying text.
5:1 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Control of Drug and Alcohol Use
for Personnel Engaged in Commercial and General Aviation Activities, 51 Fed.
Reg. 44,432 (1986). The ANPRM invited comments on drug and alcohol abuse in
aviation and suggestions for possible methods of detecting and controlling abuse.
Id. at 44,432.
N4 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Anti-Drug Program for Personnel Engaged
in Specified Aviation Activities, 53 Fed. Reg. 8368 (1988) [hereinafter NPRM,
Anti-Drug Program] (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 61, 63, 65, 121 and 135) (pro-
posed Mar. 14, 1988).
55 Id. at 8368-78.
56 Id. at 8368-74.
57 Notice of Public Hearing, 53 Fed. Reg. 18,250 (1988). Hearings were held on
June 2-3, 1988, in Washington D.C., on June 7, 1988, in Denver, Colorado and
June 9, 1988, in San Francisco, California. Id.
5, FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,024.
59 See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
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why and when of testing.6° It also addresses the signifi-
cant differences between the NPRM and the final rule
6 1
and includes a comment on the FAA's analysis of the pos-
sible constitutional challenges to the final rule.62
A. Who, How, Why and When
The FAA program requires domestic, flag and supple-
mental air carriers, air taxi and commuter operators and
commercial operators of large aircraft to implement an
anti-drug program which meets with FAA approval.63 Pri-
vate air-traffic controllers are also required to implement
drug testing programs. 64 Testing is required of all em-
ployees in sensitive safety or security related positions.6 5
The positions to be tested include flight personnel, in-
structors, dispatchers, maintenance and security person-
nel and air traffic controllers.6 6 These employees are to
be tested in accordance with Department of Transporta-
tion guidelines, 67 and the test results are to be analyzed
only by laboratories approved by the Department of
Health and Human Services.68
Testing occurs in six separate instances. Employers
may not hire an individual to fill a covered position unless
the applicant passes a drug test.69 Current employees
See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
112 See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
,;:, FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,055 (Conclusion). The final rule
amends 14 C.F.R. parts 61, 63, 65, 121 and 135. Id. (List of Subjects).
6. 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (11) (1989) (Definitions). In addition, employees of
contractors who perform covered services for FAA certificate holders are to be
tested as employees of the certificate holder. Id.
65Id.
Id. at (III) (Employees Who Must be Tested).
Id. at (I) (DOT Procedures) (testing is to be conducted in accordance with the
"Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs," 49 C.F.R.
pt. 40 (1989)).
- Id. (certified laboratories must conform to the Department of Health and
Human Services "Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing
Programs," 53 Fed. Reg. 11,970 (1988)).
.i.. Id. at (V)(A) (Preemployment Testing). Employers are required to inform
applicants that they will be tested for the five prohibited substances and their me-
tabolites. Id.
1990] COMMENTS 771
must submit to an annual drug test, at least during the
first year of the program. 70  After the initial year of the
program this component is replaced by random testing.
All subject employees must be included in a random
number pool, from which a number equal to fifty percent
of the total population must be tested annually. 7' The
level of random testing was reduced from an initial pro-
posed rate of one hundred twenty-five percent to fifty per-
cent in the final rule. 72
In addition to the three general classes of testing, there
are three types of testing specific to either the situation or
the employee. First, in the event of an accident, 73 all em-
ployees whose performance could have contributed to the
accident are to be tested within thirty-two hours of the ac-
cident.7 4 Second, on the recommendation, or absent the
recommendation, at a minimum with the support of two
supervisors, employers may require employees to submit
to urine tests based on a reasonable suspicion of drug
use. 75 Finally, for those employees who have failed drug
tests and later returned to work, employers are required
7o Id. at (V)(B) (Periodic Testing). All covered employees must be tested dur-
ing their first medical examination in the initial year of the program. These an-
nual tests may be discontinued after the employer has conducted random tests for
one year. Id.
71 Id. at (V)(C) (Random Testing). Random testing is to be conducted at regu-
lar intervals, for example, once a month. At the final random test in the initial
year of the program, the number of employees tested must be equal to 1/12th of
fifty percent of the total population of covered employees. In the first year of the
program, the total number of employees tested randomly must equal at least
twenty-five percent of the covered population. In subsequent years the total
number of employees tested must equal at least fifty percent of the population.
ld.
Id.7 See FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,034-35 (Comments on Ran-
dom Testing and FAA Response).
73 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (11) (1989) (Definitions). An accident is defined as
"an occurrence... in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which
the aircraft receives substantial damage." Id. (this is the National Transportation
Safety Board definition of "accident," codified at 49 C.F.R. § 830.2 (1988))
7 Id. at (V)(D) (Post-accident Testing). An employer may elect not to require a
post-accident test only if it is determined, "using the best information available at
the time of the accident, that the employee's performance could not have contrib-
uted to the accident." Id.
75 Id. at (V)(E) (Testing Based on Reasonable Cause). The employer's decision
to test "must be based on a reasonable and articulable belief that the employee is
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to implement a program of unannounced testing for a pe-
riod of up to sixty months after the employee's return.76
The program also establishes guidelines for Employee
Assistance Programs. 77 These guidelines require the em-
ployer to provide drug education and drug training pro-
grams.78 The drug training section is intended to address
the effects and consequences of drug use, and to assist
supervisory personnel in making decisions concerning
for-cause testing. 79
Test results are reviewed by an employer designated
Medical Review Officer (MRO).8 ° The MRO must be a li-
censed physician who is knowledgeable about drug use
and related problems.8 ' The MRO's duties include: re-
ceiving confirmed positive test results; notifying employ-
ees of positive results; verifying laboratory reports and
reviewing possible legitimate medical reasons for positive
results; and determining what action should be taken after
an employee tests positive.
8 2
B. Evolution of the Final Rule
Several elements of the proposed Appendix I to Part
121 were changed between the NPRM and the final rule.
The majority of these changes were technical corrections
of little impact.8 However, three of the changes address
using a prohibited drug on the basis of specific, contemporaneous physical, be-
havioral, or performance indicators of probable drug use." Id.
Id. at (V)(F) (Testing After Return to Duty).
17 Id. at (VIII) (Employee Assistance Program ("EAP")); see infra notes 94-98
and accompanying text.
1, 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (VIII) (1989) (EAP). The drug education program
must display and distribute basic information materials, a community drug assist-
ance hot-line number, and materials covering the employer's drug use policy. Id.
711 Id. The supervisory personnel given the responsibility for making decisions
to test for cause must receive at least sixty minutes of training. Id.
8" See id. at (VII) (Review of Drug Testing Results). The MRO may be either an
employee or a physician retained on a contract basis. Id.
81 Id. at (VII) (A) (MRO qualifications).
82 Id. at (VII) (B) (MRO Duties); see also FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at
47,043-45 (Comments, Medical Review Officer and FAA Response) (discussing
the changes made in the final rule regarding MROs).
.3 See FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,050-51 (Changes from the
Proposed Rule).
significant differences between the proposed rule and the
final rule.84
The definition of "failing a drug test" was expanded to
include the presence of drug metabolites as a test fail-
ure.8 5 This change reflects the broader goals of the final
testing program,8 6 and appears to be a reaction to judicial
decisions which have turned on the ability of current test-
ing technology to distinguish between on and off duty
drug use.87 The final rule also includes the presence of
drug metabolites in the definition of "positive
evidence.' '88
The second major change in the final rule is the reduc-
tion in the maximum annual testing rate.89 The proposed
rule suggested an annual rate equal to one hundred
twenty-five percent of an employer's covered employee
population.9" The final rule requires an annualized rate
equal to fifty percent of the population. 9' Commentators
felt the increased cost of the larger sample size was not
justified by an equivalent increase in deterrence.92 In ad-
dition to reducing the total annual rate, the FAA created a
phased start up period and made allowances for employ-
s See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
, Compare NPRM, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 54, at 8386 app. 1 (11) (Defini-
tions) with 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. 1 (11) (1989) (adding the phrase "drug metabo-
lite" to the definition of "failing a drug test," "passing a drug test" and "positive
evidence").
- FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,029-30 (FAA response to Com-
ments on the Lack of Evidence of a Drug Problem in the Aviation Industry). The
FAA notes that the Equal Employment Advisory Council agrees with the FAA po-
sition that the purpose of drug testing is to "enable an employer to rationally
determine if an employee has used drugs and to conclude reasonably that there is
a possibility of future impairment based on subsequent use." Id.
87 See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Carlucci, 690 F. Supp. 46 (D.D.C.
1988), afd in part, vacated in part and remanded by National Fed'n of Fed. Employees
v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. 1(11) (1989).
Compare NPRM, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 54, at 8386 app. I (V)(C)
(Random Testing) with 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (V)(C) (1989) (Random Testing).
"o NPRM, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 54, at 8386 app. I (V)(C) (Random
Testing).
!,, 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (V)(C) (1989) (Random Testing).
1"2 FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,034-35 (Comments on Random
Testing and FAA Response).
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ers with fewer than fifty covered employees.9"
The third significant revision in the final rule concerns
employee rehabilitation. 94 The proposed rule suggested
three options covering a range of employees for whom
employers would be required to offer rehabilitation.95
The final rule makes no provision for employee rehabilita-
tion.96 The decision not to require rehabilitation was
based on two main concerns raised by employers. The
FAA recognized that rehabilitation is not neatly defined
and that requiring an employer to hold a position open
for an indefinite period could be burdensome.9 7 The FAA
was also concerned with removing an employer's discre-
tion in firing employees for drug use. 98
C. Constitutional Issues Recognized by the FAA
In the extensive commentary which accompanied the fi-
nal rule, the FAA acknowledged the constitutional con-
cerns regarding mandatory drug testing.99  The
discussion focused exclusively on the issues raised by the
fourth amendment.'0 0 The agency noted that the FAA
mandated tests must be found to be both a search and a
governmental action to be covered by the fourth amend-
sr, 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I(V)(C) (1989) (Random Testing). Employers with less
than 50 employees are given additional time to submit their testing programs and
are allowed to pool employees in joint testing plans, Id.
94 Compare NPRM, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 54, at 8386 app. I (VIII) (A)(EAP Rehabilitation Program) with 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (VIII) (1989) (EAP).
See also FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,024. (Comments to Employee
Assistance Programs and Rehabilitation and FAA Response).
l'- NPRM, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 54, at 8386 app. I (VIII)(A) (EAP Re-
habilitation Program). The proposed rule suggested three rehabilitation program
options. Option I provided rehabilitation for employees who voluntarily enrolled
or employees whose drug use was detected by periodic, random, postaccident or
for cause testing. Option 2 provided rehabilitation only for those employees who
voluntarily enrolled or whose drug use was detected by random or periodic test-
ing. Option 3 only provided rehabilitation for employees who volunteered. Id.;
14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (VIII) (1989).
1"1 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 app. I (VIII) (1989).
"1 FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,038-41 (Comments to Employee
Assistance Programs, Rehabilitation and FAA Response).
Im /d.




ment. t '0 A brief outline of the agency's fourth amend-
ment position is helpful in analyzing the recent Supreme
Court decisions and comparing them to the FAA drug
program.
The FAA began by citing Supreme Court decisions
which held that reasonable searches may be constitu-
tional, even in the absence of a warrant.' 0 2 The agency
pointed out that reasonableness is established by balanc-
ing the invasion of the subject's privacy interest against
the public interest protected by the search.' 0 3 In this in-
stance the FAA argued that the overwhelming public in-
terest in aviation safety outweighed the "minimal"
intrusion into the employee's privacy.' 4
This intrusion was even less significant in light of what
the FAA termed the indisputably pervasive regulation of
aviation employees, by both the government and their
employers.' 0 5 The agency analogized the regulation of
aviation employees to that of horse racing jockeys.'0 6 In
Shoemaker v. Handel, the Third Circuit held that extensive
regulation reduced the jockeys' reasonable expectations
,, Id. The Supreme Court held that tests conducted under the Federal Rail-
road Administration's Drug Program were both searches and government actions.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-13 (1989); see
also infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
1..2 FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,027-29 (Discussion of Constitu-
tional Issues).
. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding the war-
rantless search of public school student's purse was reasonable based on a reason-
able suspicion that it contained cigarettes in violation of school policy); Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (in
which the majority held roving searches of automobiles twenty miles north of the
Mexican border unreasonable); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533
(1967)(prohibiting prosecution for refusal to allow a warrantless non-emergency
housing code inspection)).
1..4 Id. (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)
(the majority upheld the border detention of a woman who was smuggling 88
balloons of cocaine in her alimentary canal, based on a reasonable and articulable
suspicion)).
,,r, Id. The agency did not cite specific existing regulation of aviation employ-
ees. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
... FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,027 (Discussion of Constitu-
tional Issues).
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of privacy. 0 7 Balancing these reduced privacy expecta-
tions against the public interest in assuring the integrity of
the horse racing industry, the Third Circuit held that
mandatory testing of jockeys was reasonable. 108
The agency also compared its program to other admin-
istrative searches which have been held constitutional.10 9
It argued that the Fifth Circuit test in Von Raab I was the
appropriate balancing test"10 and concluded that, under
that standard, the final rule would withstand any constitu-
tional challenges. "'
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISONS
A. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
The Ninth Circuit found the drug testing program re-
quired by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to
be an unreasonable search in Railway Labor Executives'Asso-
ciation v. Burnley. 112 This judgment was reversed by the
Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'Associ-
ation.1 '3 Although the Supreme Court's analysis of the
FRA regulation will obviously control any challenges to
the FAA testing program, a brief review of the Burnley de-
cision may be helpful in understanding the Supreme
Court's fourth amendment analysis. The Burnley opinion
also considered other constitutional issues raised by drug
testing which were not presented to the Supreme Court in
Skinner. "14
"'7 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir.) (allowing the New Jersey Racing Commission to
require jockeys to submit to random breath and urine tests), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986).
.... Id. at 1142-43. The court discussed both the state's licensing requirements
for jockeys and regulations which authorized warrantless searches of stables as
evidence of the high level of regulation in the industry. Id. at 1141-42.




'"- 839 F.2d 575, 577 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub noma. Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422 (1989).
Burnley I, 839 F.2d at 591-92; see infra notes 139-152 and accompanying text
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1. The Ninth Circuit Decision
Based on the government's involvement in promulgat-
ing the regulations, the Ninth Circuit found that the test-
ing program was a government action even though the
actual testing was performed by the railroads." 5 The
court also held that the testing required by the FRA regu-
lations was a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment." 6 The final element in the court's analysis
was an inquiry into whether the testing program was
reasonable. 1 17
The court's examination began by noting that the tradi-
tional test of the reasonableness of a search is whether it
was authorized by the issuance of a warrant." 8 The in-
dependent judicial review required to obtain a warrant in-
sures that the government had probable cause and
therefore that the search was reasonable.' Although a
warrant is the traditional guaranty of reasonableness, the
court discussed a long list of established exceptions to the
requirement. 20 The exception which has been carved out
for administrative searches in closely regulated industries
was found to be the most applicable to the FRA testing
program.' 2' However, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
for a discussion of the other constitutional challenges addressed by the Ninth
Circuit.
Burnely I, 839 F.2d at 579-80.
Id. at 580-82. The FAA testing program, like the FRA program, is not actu-
ally conducted by the government. The Ninth Circuit cited the analysis of airport
security searches in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 896-904 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that searches by airport personnel instigated to prevent hijackings were
government actions when "the governement participates in any significant way in
a total course of conduct .... Id. at 897).
117 Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 582-589.
" Id. at 582.
II- Id.
12.. Id. at 583 n. 11. The exceptions considered by the court included "(1)
searches incident to lawful arrest, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); (2)
the 'automobile exception,' Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (3) hot
pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (4) stop and frisk, Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968); (5) plain view, Co[o]lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) .... Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 583 n.ll.
, Burnley I, 839 F.2d at 583-84. The justification for the exception is articu-
lated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a New York statute
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previously permitted administrative searches from the
FRA testing program based on the personal nature of the
search and the greater degree of intrusiveness involved in
urinalysis. 122
After rejecting the proposed analogies to existing ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement, the court analyzed
the testing program to determine if it satisfied the stan-
dard of reasonableness on its own. 2  The Ninth Circuit
relied on a balancing test originally stated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Place.'24  The test required
"balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the im-
portance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion."'' 25 Noting the strong government interest
in public safety, the court held that a finding of probable
cause would not be required to justify the search. 126 In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit relied on a test articulated in Terry
v. Ohio127 to determine whether the government interest
justified the intrusion.12  The Terry test required a finding
that the search was "justified at its inception" and "rea-
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justi-
fied the interference in the first place."'' 2 9
authorizing warrantless inspections ofjunkyards). Owners and operators of busi-
nesses in highly regulated industries have reduced expectations of privacy. These
reduced privacy expectations lower the requirement of reasonableness with re-
gard to the issuance of warrants and in the case of warrantless searches. Burnley I,
839 F.2d at 584.
I22 d. at 584-85. The court noted that previous administrative search decisions
had addressed the owner's privacy expectations with regard to the business prem-
ises, not an employee's personal privacy expectations. Id. at 585.
-.. Id. at 586-89. The fourth amendment only prohibits searches which are un-
reasonable. U.S. CONST. amend IV. See supra notes 112-122.
"-' 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
12, Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 586. This is also the balancing test adopted in the
second Supreme Court decision recognizing the "special needs" exception. See
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (justifying the search of a government
employee's desk based on a suspicion of misconduct).
.... Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 587.
12, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding a patrolman's stop and frisk search based on
the officer's suspicions).
"-" Burnley I, 839 F.2d at 587.
129 Id. The "justified at inception" prong of the test was the key factor in the
Ninth Circuit analysis. The court cited five federal cases in support of its position
[55
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In applying this test the Ninth Circuit discounted the
government's assertion that a link existed between rail ac-
cidents and drug or alcohol abuse.13 Finding no inherent
link between drugs and accidents, the court decided that,
to be reasonable, the FRA tests would have to be based on
individualized suspicion.' 31 Since the post-accident test-
ing did not require individualized suspicion, the Ninth




The FRA also argued that the language of the regula-
tions created an implied consent on the part of railroad
employees. 3 3 A valid consent would remove the need for
a warrant. 34  In the same vein, the FRA argued that a
search which has been consented to is reasonable by defi-
nition.1 35 The Burnley I court found that when a search has
been held unreasonable, it may not be validated on the
basis of implied consent. 136 The determination was based
that this standard required a finding of individualized suspicion: Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1568
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (testing of city bus drivers and maintenance workers); Feliciano
v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578, 589 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (testing of police
academy cadets); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F.
Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (testing of civilian police officers); Lovvorn v. City of
Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (testing of firemen); Capua v.
City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.NJ. 1986) (testing of firemen and
policemen).
1: Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 587. "Accidents, incidents or rules violations, by
themselves, do not create reasonable grounds for suspecting that tests will
demonstrate alcohol or drug impairment in any one railroad employee, much less
an entire crew." Id.
-1 Id. at 587-88.
1:.2 Id. at 588.
,-- Id. at 589; see 49 C.F.R. § 219.11 (a) (1988). "Any employee who performs
covered service for a railroad . . . shall be deemed to have consented to testing
.... Id.
..... Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 589, rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
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on the nature and timing of the consent. 3 7 The court
held that "advance consent to future unreasonable
searches is not a reasonable condition of employment."'' 38
After finding the FRA drug tests in conflict with the
protection provided by the fourth amendment, and dis-
pensing with the FRA's consent defense, the court ad-
dressed the remaining constitutional objections raised by
the RLEA. Having already held the tests unconstitutional,
this analysis is dicta. It may, however, be of some value in
predicting the fate of the FAA regulations.
Privacy
The Railway Executives claimed that mandatory drug
tests abridged those fundamental rights of privacy recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade.'3 9 The court's analysis outlined the
areas to which these privacy rights have been extended.
These include family planning, 40  abortion, 41  mar-
riage, 4 2  and certain family living arrangements.143
Although no right to personal autonomy in drug and alco-
hol use is presently recognized, 44 the court held that a
, 7 Id. (citing National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935,
943 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
.... Id. (quoting McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985),
afy'das modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987)). The court noted that consent was
implied by the regulation and that the employees had only two options, consent to
the tests or seek new employment. Id.
rl!, Id. at 591. The Supreme Court's opinion in Roe recognized a woman's pri-
vacy rights in the decision to have an abortion. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Roe
decision relied in part on the recognition by Justice Douglas, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), of penumbral privacy rights which emanated from
the specific protections of the Bill of Rights.
'4" Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
'4 Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
112 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
..... Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
.... Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 591 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989). The Supreme Court decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), may confront an analagous issue. The
Court emphasized the relationship between recognized privacy rights and family
decision making in holding no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sod-
omy existed because there was no connection between family decision making and
homosexual activity.
right to keep such information private exists. 145 Although
the court noted that the FRA regulations made no provi-
sion for protecting employees from potential disclosure of
tests results, they chose not to consider the issue on ripe-
ness grounds.
Equal Protection
The final constitutional challenge brought by the Rail-
way Executives was that the statute was under-inclusive
and therefore discriminated against certain classes of rail-
road employees. 146 The RLEA argued that the discrimina-
tory nature of the regulations violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 47 Spe-
cifically, the RLEA argued that the failure to include su-
pervisory personnel, who might also be responsible for
accidents, in the group of employees subject to testing
was discriminatory. 4 8 The court noted that the equal
protection clause only required that there be a "rational
relationship between a classification scheme and the gov-
ernment objective."' 149  Further, the group selected for
testing was the same group of employees for whom Con-
gress had designated specific limitations on work hours
for safety purposes. 5 0  The court held this relationship
was sufficiently rational to justify the selection of the same
employees for drug testing.' 5' The court also noted that
1, Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 591; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (although
recognizing a right to keep information about drug use private, the decision up-
held a New York statute which required pharmacists to report prescriptions of
certain drugs to a central data base on the grounds that the statute provided suffi-
cient safeguards against disclosure).
... Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 592, rev 'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
147 Id.
I Id.; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling challenged racial
segregation in Distict of Columbia private schools. The Court held that "equal
protection of the laws" was a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness
than due process. Id. at 499.
111, Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 592.
15.. Id.; see Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-64b (1982) (limiting the hours
railroad employees may work without a rest period).
it., Burnley 1, 839 F.2d at 592. The court observed that "[i]t makes sense to
mandate drug and alcohol testing of the same group for the same reasons." Id.
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supervisory personnel are subject to discretionary drug
testing under existing regulations. 52
2. The Supreme Court Decision
The majority opinion in the Supreme Court's decision
in Skinner began with a discussion of the history of alcohol
abuse in the railroad industry.'53 This pointed answer to
the Ninth Circuit's inability to discern a justifiable link be-
tween rail accidents and drug or alcohol abuse set the
tone for the seven justice majority's analysis of the FRA
regulations. 1 54
The opinion continued with a review of the historical
development of alcohol related regulations in the railroad
industry culminating with the challenged FRA regula-
tions. 55 After outlining the specific provisions of the test-
ing program, which involved blood tests, breath tests and
urinalysis, the Court recited the findings of the district
and appellate courts.' 56 The district court held the em-
ployee's privacy interests were outweighed by the govern-
ment's safety concerns.1 57 As discussed above, the Ninth
Circuit found that, absent an individualized suspicion as
to particular employees, the tests were unreasonable
searches. 58
The only issue before the Supreme Court was whether
the testing program violated the employees' fourth
amendment rights. The Court began with a traditional
.2 Id.
.... Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1407 (1989).
The Court noted that the relationship between alcohol and the railroads was "as
old as the industry itself." Id.
' Id. The Ninth Cirucit held that absent an individualized suspicion concern-
ing an employee the FRA drug testing program was an unreasonable search.
Burnley I, 839 at 575, 588, rev'd sub nom. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989); see also supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
,55 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407. The Court noted that the industry has had regu-
lations prohibiting on the job alcohol consumption for over one hundred years.
Id.
Ir"; Id. at 1410-1i.
1 Id. at 1410.
'r- See supra notes 112-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth
Circuit decision.
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fourth amendment analysis, considering whether the pro-
gram was a government action and, if so, whether it was a
search or seizure.'" 9 First, the Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the tests were a private action, not-
ing the degree of government participation and the
regulation's pre-emption of the state law.' 60 Then citing
the seminal case on body fluid testing, Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 16  the Court held the proposed blood tests were
searches. 162 The Court also determined that the breath
tests and urinalysis were searches covered by the fourth
amendment. 163
Reasonableness
The next element in the traditional fourth amendment
analysis is an inquiry into the reasonableness of the search
and seizure. The fourth amendment only prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures. 64 The "permissibility"
of a search is established "by balancing its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."165
Although this balancing is usually performed prior to the
search through the issuance of a warrant based on prob-
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1411-13.
Id. at 1411. The Court stated that railroad compliance with subpart C, Post-
Accident Toxicological Testing, was required by law. The Court rejected the ar-
gument that because testing under subpart D, Authorization to Test for Cause,
was discretionary it was not also a government action. Id.
"i 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (holding blood tests administered to determine
alcohol content were searches under the fourth amendment).
-2 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1412.
-, Id. at 1412-13. The Court cited California v. Trombeta, 467 U.S. 479, 481
(1984), as authority for its finding on breath tests. The Court also noted that the
federal courts of appeal have unanimously held urine tests to be searches. Skinner,
109 S. Ct. at 1413 n.4.
'' U.S. CONST. amend IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated... " Id.
,, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
Citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (holding discretionary spot
checks of vehicles to be a violation of fourth amendment rights); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976) (upholding questioning vehicle occu-
pants at fixed checkpoints).
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able cause, the Court cited five cases as precedent for its
holding that in certain non-criminal situations, a "special
need" may "make the warrant and probable cause re-
quirement impractical." 166
It is on this point and its application to FRA regulations
that the majority and the dissent parted company. Rely-
ing on the diminished privacy expectations of workers in
highly regulated industries, 67 and the powerful govern-
ment interest in public safety,' 68 the majority cited the
prior opinions as support for its holding.'6 9 The dissent
distinguished the "special needs" cases, citing the per-
sonal nature of the search and the absence of individual-
ized suspicion, and by questioning the validity of the
program's deterrent effect relative to the government ob-
jective of enhanced public safety.' 70
Special Needs
The five "special needs" cases cited by the majority rep-
resent the development of the newest exception to the
warrant requirement.' 7' All of the searches held reason-
able based on the government's "special needs" were
non-criminal. 172  In each case the Court found that a
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414. The court cited Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987) (upholding the search of a probationer's home); New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987) (upholding a New York statute authorizing warrantless in-
spections ofjunkyards); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (upholding
work related searches of government employees' desks); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (permitting a search of a high school student's purse); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding body cavity searches of prison inmates).
,,17 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418-19.
", Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1421.
'7, Id. at 1432.
'7, See Burkoff, Antecedent Justification for Warrantless Search and Seizure Activity, 12
SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 166 (1985); Carr, An Overview of the Supreme Court's
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Decisions in the 1988-89 Term, 16 Search and Seizure L. Rep.
(1989); Joseph, Privacy in the Workplace: Issues Arising in O'Connor v. Ortega, 15
SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 1 (1989); Lewis, Searches of Probationers and Parolees
After Griffin v. Wisconsin, 15 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 25 (1988).
'72 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
This element of the "special needs" exception was first articulated in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351
(1985).
strong government interest outweighed the individual's
reduced privacy expectations, making the search reason-
able despite the absence of either a warrant or probable
cause. '
73
Noting that the rail employees covered by the testing
program performed "safety-sensitive tasks" and were al-
ready regulated by the Hours of Service Act, 174 the major-
ity determined that post-accident testing would not be
unreasonable even without the presence of an individual-
ized suspicion concerning the subject employee. 175 The
tests were reasonable because the employees' reduced ex-
pectations of privacy were outweighed by the govern-
ment's interest in increasing public safety. 76 The tests
were found to increase public safety both by deterring
drug and alcohol abuse by covered employees, and by
providing information about the causes of rail accidents
which might help prevent future accidents. 77 The Court
was not persuaded by the RLEA's argument that the
scope of the information provided by the tests went be-
yond the government's justifiable concerns with on the
job drug or alcohol abuse. 78 The Court also found that
17-1 The previous government interests included: a state's operation of its proba-
tion system, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1989); a state's interest in
detecting and deterring automobile theft, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708
(1987); the "efficient and proper" operation of a government workplace,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987); the need to maintain discipline in
schools, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339; and the maintenance of prison security, Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
174 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414; see Hours of Service Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-64b
(1982) (limiting the hours certain railroad employees may work without a rest
period).
175 Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1414-21. The Court also noted that the requirement of
a warrant would undermine the effectiveness of the search given the short time
periods involved and the fact that the tests were to be administered by supervisors
unfamiliar with the warrant process. Id. at 1416-17.
17,1 Id. at 1419-21.
177 Id. at 1419-20.
'7" Id. at 1420-21. The Court held that the presence of drug metabolites in an
employee's urine sample, indicating prior drug use, was relevant to the issue of
the employee's on-the-job impairment. The Court decided that the connection
was sufficient to justify the use of urinalysis. For a discussion of the metabolism of
drugs and its relevance to drug testing, see Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing. Scientific
Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV. 415, 432-35 (1987).
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the safeguard provisions of the regulations governing the
collection of urine samples adequately diminished the in-
trusive nature of this procedure.179
The Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Marshall and joined by
Justice Brennan, argued that the majority had extended
the scope of the "special needs" exception, both as to the
personal nature of the search and the requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion, without any justification or explana-
tion. 180 Justice Marshall's discussion began with an
examination of the express textual requirements of the
fourth amendment, 18 1 suggesting that no support for the
"special needs" exception can be found in the Constitu-
tion. The balance of his discussion of the majority's opin-
ion examined the manner in which the decision increased
the scope of the exception. The dissent argued that the
application of this exception to historically private areas,
absent any individualized suspicion, went well beyond the
rationales justifying the search of a student's purse or an
employee's desk. 182
Justice Marshall also took issue with the position that
the tests will have a sufficient deterrent effect on em-
ployee drug use to justify considering that effect as a fac-
tor in the balancing test. 83 This point was also raised by
Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, although he ul-
timately agreed with the result reached by the majority. 8 4
Their point was that the potential for death from a drug
related accident was a greater deterrent than the possibil-
ity of failing a drug text. 85
,7,, Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1418.
I" ld. at 1425.
'' Id. at 1423-26.
Id. at 1426-30. Justice Marshall pointed out that the extension of a "special
needs" exception to mass drug tests increased the scope of intrusion previously
permitted under the exception and, at the same time, decreased to zero the
amount of suspicion required to justify a search. Id.
-1 Id. at 1432.
I4 d. at 1422.
'" Id. at 1432. Marshall compared the majority's analysis to the position that
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Analysis
The Skinner decision establishes three major points
which may be relevant in challenges to the FAA testing
program. First, and most important, the decision rejects
the Ninth Circuit's restrictive fourth amendment analysis,
and relies on the more general "special needs" balancing
test. 8 6 Second, the decision affirms the government's
right to require drug testing of private sector employ-
ees. 187 Finally, the Court approves deterrence as ajustifi-
cation for mass searches. 188
There are, however, several factors which distinguish
the railroad industry and the FRA testing program from
the aviation industry and the FAA program. In Skinner the
government presented substantial documentation of the
history of substance abuse among railroad workers. 8 9 As
evidenced by the comments to the FAA program, there is
virtually no evidence of a drug problem in aviation.1 90
Also, the program upheld by the Supreme Court in Skin-
ner provided only for post-accident and for-cause test-
ing. ' The FAA program, however, provides for random
testing on a large scale. 9 2 It is possible that given the less
intrusive tests required by the FAA program (i.e., post-
accident and for-cause testing), the inclusion of random
tests may not provide sufficient additional safety assur-
ance to justify the increased intrusion on employees' pri-
vacy expectations. A final distinction between the two
"people who skip school or work to spend a sunny day at the zoo will not taunt the
lions because their truancy or absenteeism might be discovered in the event they
are mauled." Id.
1- See supra notes 166-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's fourth amendment analysis.
117 Skinner v: Railway Labor Exectuives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1421-22
(1989).
'" See supra notes 175-177.
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1407 n.1; see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,029 (Lack of Evidence of a Drug
Problem in the Aviation Industry). The FAA did note that the investigation of the
Continental Air Express crash on January 19, 1988 revealed the presence of co-
caine and cocaine metabolites in the pilot's system. Id.
, Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1408-10; see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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testing programs is the absence of any testing for alcohol
in the FAA program. This shortcoming may subject the
program to challenge on the grounds that it is underinclu-
sive and does not sufficiently increase public safety and is
therefore an unjustifiable intrusion.' 93
B. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
Von Raab H, the companion case to Skinner, involved a
challenge to a U.S. Customs Service drug testing program
which required employees to submit to drug tests in order
to qualify for specified sensitive positions.' 94 The facts
and circumstances surrounding the program differ from
both the FRA and FAA testing programs in two significant
aspects: the union members' status as government em-
ployees and their direct involvement in the national war
on drugs.' 95 As a result, the decision relied on factors
supporting the government's interest in preventing drug
use which are not present in either the FRA or the FAA
testing programs. Despite these distinctions, the major-
ity's "special needs" analysis and the four-justice dissent,
written by Justice Scalia, may both be helpful in analyzing
the FAA program.
1. The Fifth Circuit
In Von Raab I, the Fifth Circuit found that the Customs
Service program was a reasonable search for the purposes
of the fourth amendment. 196 The appellate court decision
', Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1432. The Skinner dissent advanced a similar argument
regarding the deterrent effect of the FRA program. Id. The application of this
reasoning to the FAA program hinges on the safety risks which the FAA program
does not address, specifically, alcohol and prescription drug abuse. If there is any
significant risk of harm to the public arising out of employee abuse of those sub-
stances, one can argue that the government's safety concerns are not adequately
served by the existing program, and that, therefore, the resulting intrusion into
the employee's privacy outweighs the government's safety concerns.
.... National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989)
(Von Raab II).
See id. at 1392-93.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 173 (5th
Cir. 1987) (Von Raab I) afd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1384
(1989).
focused on the government's interest in employing non-
drug users in its drug enforcement program, the reduced
privacy expectations of government employees and the
program's efforts to minimize the inherent intrusiveness
of mandatory urinalysis. 97 One significant aspect of the
Customs tests, discussed by both the Fifth Circuit and the
Supreme Court, was the fact that the tests were not in re-
sponse to an actual or even a perceived drug problem
among employees.' 8
In finding the testing program reasonable, the Fifth Cir-
cuit first noted that it was a government action and that
the testing program was a search.' 99 The court began its
analysis of the reasonableness of the search by reviewing
the factors cited by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 200
the first Supreme Court decision recognizing the "special
needs" exception. In addition to those factors, the court
considered the voluntary and administrative nature of the
search, the availability of less intrusive alternatives and
the impact of the employment relationship on privacy ex-
pectations. 20  Balancing all these factors, the court found
the searches reasonable based on the significant govern-
ment interest and the reduced privacy expectations of
those employees seeking transfers to sensitive
positions.2 °2
The union had also challenged the testing program as
an infringement on the employees' fifth amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination, their penumbral privacy
rights and for being so unreliable that they violated due
197 id. at 176-80.
-- Von Raab H, 109 S. Ct. at 1387-88; Von Raab I, 816 F.2d at 173.
1w, Von Raab 1, 816 F.2d at 173.
2.... Id. at 176 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). The Bell decision
listed the scope and manner of search, the justification for the search, and the
place where the search took place as factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the search. Bell, 441 U.S. at 520.
2-" Von Raab I, 816 F.2d at 178-80.
2-" Id. at 173. The dissent took the position that because employees currently
holding sensitive positions were not tested, and transferees were not subsequently
tested, the tests were an ineffective means of achieving their stated objectives and
were therefore unreasonable. Id. at 182-84.
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process.2 °3 The union elected not to rely on the privacy
argument on appeal, and the court rejected both the self-
incrimination and due process arguments. °4
2. The Supreme Court Decision
Justice Kennedy writing for a five-justice majority af-
firmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. The Court held
that the program was a reasonable search under the "spe-
cial needs" exception because the government's interests
in the integrity of its drug enforcement work force and
public safety outweighed the intrusion on the employees'
privacy expectations.20 5 The sections of the opinion
which may be particularly relevant to the FAA testing pro-
gram focused on the justifications for a testing program
despite the absence of any indication of a drug problem
among the covered employees, and the related proposi-
tion that drug tests may be reasonable searches even
when undertaken with little or no expectation of uncover-
ing drug use.
Deterrence as Justification
The union argued that the testing program was unrea-
sonable because it was not founded on a belief that drug
tests would ferret out drug using employees.20 6 Although
it was not addressed by the majority, the basis of this ar-
gument appears to be that deterrence is an unreasonable
justification for a search.20 7 In considering this point, the
Court noted the seriousness of our national drug problem
and argued that it was unreasonable to assume that any
Id. at 181-82.
Id. at 181.
Von Raab 1I, 109 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
2116 Id. at 1394.
2... Id. at 1392. The Court rejected this position citing several cases upholding
searches and inspections undertaken to prevent either certain activities or the de-
velopment of certain conditions. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (border area traffic stops); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967) (building code inspections)).
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segment of the work force was insulated from its effect. 20 8
The Court also emphasized the importance of the Cus-
toms Service's need to keep drug users out of drug en-
forcement. 20 9  Dismissing the imposition on the vast
majority of employees who do not use drugs, the Court
noted that the large ratio of searches to violations had not
made building inspections or border checkpoints unrea-
sonable in prior cases.2 10
The Dissent
[A]II this contains much that is obviously true, and much
that is relevant; unfortunately, what is obviously true is not
relevant, and what is relevant is not obviously true.2 1'
Justice Scalia's paraphrase of Mr. Churchill suggests the
elements of the majority's opinion which left him uncon-
vinced. The dissent is based on three points. First, the
government produced no evidence of a drug problem
within the Customs Service.21 2 Second, the argument that
Customs officials who use drugs will be either less willing
to enforce the law, or more likely to be bribed or compro-
mised, was unpersuasive.213 Finally, the employees' natu-
ral concerns about performing hazardous tasks, such as
engaging in gun battles with drug smugglers while under
the influence of drugs, will be more effective deterrents
than concerns about failing a drug test.2 4
Unpersuaded by the government's deterence and safety
arguments, Justice Scalia argued that the function of the
... Id. at 1395.
2,Id.
2"1 Id. The union pointed out during oral argument that only five of the 3600
employees tested failed drug tests. Id. at 1394; see also supra note 207.
211 Von Raab II, 109 S. Ct. at 1399 (1989).
212 Id. at 1399-1400. Justice Scalia also noted that the government was unable
to point to any instance in which drug use by a Customs Services employee had
resulted in "bribe-taking," "poor aim," or "unsympathetic law enforcement." Id.
at 1400.
-,,: Id. at 1400-01.
214 Id. at 1399. This is the same point made injustice Steven's concurrence and
Justice Marshall's dissent in Skinner; see supra notes 183-185 and accompanying
text.
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testing program was to set an example for the nation in
the war on drugs.2 t5 He condemned this justification as
an example of an "ends justifying the means" analysis.2 t6
Emphasizing the danger of this approach, his dissent con-
cluded with a quotation from Justice Brandeis' famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States217: "The greatest dan-
gers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 21 8
3. Analysis
The Von Raab II decision indicates two factors in the
circumstances surrounding the Customs Service tests
which may be used in support of the FAA program. First,
the Supreme Court found that the lack of evidence of a
drug problem did not prevent mandatory drug testing
from being a reasonable means of addressing the
problems which would result from a drug problem. 9
The second point, closely related to the first, is that even
in the absence of a drug problem, deterrence is a valid
justification for large scale drug testing programs. 220
Like the FRA program which was the subject of the
Skinner decision, there are also several distinctions be-
tween the Customs Service program and the FAA pro-
gram. The most obvious distinction is that those subject
to testing are government employees. The Court noted
that this acts both to increase the government's interest in
ensuring that its employees are not drug users22' and to
reduce the employees' reasonable privacy expectations. 222
The employees tested under the FAA program, however,
2-15 Von Raab I1, 109 S. Ct. at 1401. Justice Scalia noted that this role was sug-
gested by the Customs Service commissioner's memorandum implementing the
program. Id.
216 Id. at 1402.
217 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928). Justice Brandeis dissented from the majority deci-
sion which had admitted evidence obtained with an illegal wire tap. Id.
21$ Von Raab 11, 109 S. Ct. at 1402 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479).
21 Id. at 1395.
2211 Id. at 1392; supra note 207 and accompanying text.
2"1 Von Raab 11, 109 S. Ct. at 1393.
222 Id. at 1393-94.
are private sector workers. On the other hand, the highly
regulated nature of the aviation industry may sufficiently
reduce their privacy expections even without the element
of government employment.223 The second significant
distinction is the involvement in drug enforcement. This
nexus is clearly not present for aviation employees. 224 A
final distinction is the employees' discretion in being
tested. Customs Service employees may elect not to apply
for the covered positions or may decline promotion with-
out being subject to tests.225 These options are not avail-
able to airline personnel under the FAA program.
IV. DRUG TESTING OF AVIATION PERSONNEL
Skinner and Von Raab II taken together consider almost
all of the factors which must be evaluated to analyze the
FAA program under the "specific needs" exception. How-
ever, they also consider factors not present in aviation.
Where one element which supports aviation testing is
present in these decisions, such as the public concerns
surrounding an accident, another factor, not found in avi-
ation, such as a history of substance abuse, is also present.
A recent decision by the D.C. Circuit analyzing a chal-
lenge to Department of Defense and Department of
Transportation testing of civilian employees, including
aviation personnel, sheds some light on the importance to
be given the various factors.
The testing programs challenged in National Federation
of Federal Employees v. Cheney226 called for mandatory ran-
dom urinalysis of civilian Defense Department employees
working in aviation, chemical munitions, nuclear reactors
,2-.1 This position is an extension of the exception to the warrant requirement for
administrative searches in highly regulated industries. Id.; see supra notes 105-107
and accompanying text.
224 Von Raab 11, 109 S. Ct. at 1393-94. The majority emphasized this nexus and
argued it enhanced the government's interest in preventing drug use. Id.
225 Von Raab 1, 816 F.2d at 178, arid in part, vacated in part and remanded, 109 S.
Ct. 1384 (1989).
22o 884 F.2d 603 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The case combined six suits by various gov-
ernment labor organizations challenging Department of Defense and Department
of Transportation testing programs. Id.
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and law enforcement. 227 In analyzing the tests the court
elected to follow the Von Raab II analysis because the pro-
gram did not involve either blood or breath tests. 228 This
approach may also be more appropriate based on the em-
ployees' status as government workers.229
The court first considered the additional element of
random testing to determine if it precluded analysis under
the Supreme Court's new balancing test.230 Citing its ear-
lier decision in Harmon v. Thornburgh,23 t the D.C. Circuit
held that the inclusion of random testing was relevant to
the analysis but was not so significant that the "special
needs" analysis outlined in Skinner and Von Raab H was
not appropriate.23 2 The union also challenged the testing
program as overly broad because it would discover both
on-duty and off-duty drug use.233 This argument was re-
jected on two grounds. First, Skinner suggested that a
search can be reasonable even if the evidence it produced
only demonstrated an increased probability of the ulti-
mate fact. 234 Second, Von Raab II held that off-duty drug
use can create serious risks which the government has a
"broad interest" in preventing.235
The most important issue in Cheney, for the purposes of
analyzing the FAA program, is the court's analysis of the
227 Id.
2-" Id. at 609. The court noted that the Skinner decision arguably relied on the
inclusion of blood and breath tests in finding the urine tests reasonable. Id.
- Id. at 615. The reduced privacy expectations of government employees and
the government's increased interest in supervising its own employees are not spe-
cifically addressed by the D.C. Circuit. However, the Supreme Court's Von Raab
opinion discussed them at some length. Von Raab 11, 109 S. Ct. at 1393-94.
Cheney, 884 F.2d at 607-08.
878 F.2d 484, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The decision found that the random
aspect of a challenged Department ofJustice drug testing program was not a "dif-
ference in kind," but merely an additional factor to be considered in the balancing
test. Id.
232 Cheney, 884 F.2d at 608-09.
Id. at 609.
2:14 Id.; see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1421
(1989).
-135 Cheney, 884 F.2d at 609; see Von Raab H, 109 S. Ct. at 1393. The Von Raab
analysis related to government concerns about bribe taking and "unsympathetic"
law enforcement, however, and not to its public safety concerns. Id.
safety concerns raised by drug use in aviation. The court
compared the drug tests to the airport magnetometer
searches approved by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Edwards.236 In that case the court, in an opinion written by
Judge Friendly, held that the risks involved in commercial
aviation accidents, standing alone, met the reasonable-
ness standard.23 7 The importance of the magnitude of
risk as a factor was also recognized by Justice Scalia in his
Von Raab II dissent. 23 8 Commenting on the government's
reliance on generalizations about the severity of the drug
problem despite the absence of any showing of drug use
by Customs agents, Justice Scalia said: "Perhaps such a
generalization would suffice if the workplace at issue
could produce such catastrophic social harm that no risk
whatever is tolerable .... ",239 Although the work place he
referred to was a nuclear power plant, it is clear that the
degree of risk created by drug use in the aviation industry
is considerable and may justify significant intrusions into
employees' expectations of privacy.
Another important aspect of the Cheney decision is the
court's willingness to question the need to test certain
employees while approving the testing of others. Follow-
ing its decision in Harmon v. Thornburgh, the D.C. Circuit
remanded for more factual development the decision con-
cerning the testing of nuclear workers, employees han-
dling chemical munitions and laboratory personnel.240
The court rejected the Army's assertion that the testing of
employees involved in the execution of its drug testing
2..6 Cheney, 884 F.2d at 610, citing United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d
Cir. 1974).
237 Edwards, 498 F.2d at 500. "When the risk is the jeopardy of hundreds of
human lives and millions of dollars of property ... th[at] danger alone meets the
test of reasonableness .... " Id.
2:.. Von Raab 11, 109 S. Ct. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2:11 Id.
24.. Cheney, 884 F.2d at 611. The Supreme Court also distinguished between
different job descriptions in Von Raab, remanding for futher consideration the
testing of employees who handle classified material. lon Raab I1, 109 S. Ct. at
1396-97.
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program was reasonable.24'
Analysis
In descending order of importance, the three most im-
portant issues discussed by the D.C. Circuit in Cheney are:
the risks created by possible drug use in the aviation in-
dustry; the importance, as a balancing factor, of random
testing; and the willingness to uphold testing of certain
employee groups but reject the testing of others.
The potential for harm resulting from drug use in avia-
tion is the most important issue because it is the critical
factor on the government interest side of the scale. 242 If
the potential harm is not mitigated by a consideration of
the likelihood of its occurence, the "special needs" of the
government appear to outweigh the employees' expecta-
tions of privacy. However, if consideration is given to the
minimal evidence of a drug problem in the aviation indus-
try, then the government's need may not be so urgent.
The remaining two issues discussed in Cheney may also
factor in the analysis of the FAA program. First, the ele-
ment of random testing, particulary of the scope required
by the FAA program, may be viewed as signficantly in-
creasing the intrusiveness of the testing program. 243 Sec-
ond, the willingness of the courts to evaluate the need to
test covered employees on a position by position basis
may mean that the risks involved in less sensitive positions
will be found not to justify drug testing.244 For example,
Cheney, 884 F.2d at 614-15. This finding relied on the Von Raab nexus argu-
ment. Id.
242 See FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,027 (Discussion of Constitu-
tional Issues). "The imparing effects of illegal drugs and the substantial risks to
public safety posed by aviation employees who use illegal drugs underlies the
compelling governmental interests in promulgating this final rule." Id.; see supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
2-, This issue is raised by the labor groups representing aviation employees in
their petition for review pending in the Ninth Circuit. Bluestein v. Skinner, No.
88-7503 (9th Cir. argued Sept. 15, 1989); see infra notes 253-256.
21 Individual review of specific positions has resulted in testing programs being
remanded for more factual development on invalidated outright for those catego-
ries found not to satisfy the "special needs" analysis. See Von Raab 11, 109 S. Ct. at
1396-97; National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 613-15
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although the concerns created by drug impaired pilots or
mechanics are obvious, the courts may determine that the
threat to public safety created by an impaired flight at-
tendant does not justify the intrusiveness of drug testing.
V. CURRENT CHALLENGES - BLUESTEIN V. SKINNER
The Ninth Circuit recently heard argument in six con-
solidated cases petitioning for review of the FAA's final
rule establishing the drug testing program.245 The suits
were brought by individuals affected by the program and
by several labor groups representing aviation person-
nel.246 The plaintiffs presented issues challenging the fi-
nal rule as an unreasonable search and seizure 247 and for
violating the Administrative Procedure Act. 248 This dis-
cussion will focus on the fourth amendment challenges.
The Bluestein plaintiffs challenged the FAA testing pro-
gram as an unreasonable search and seizure for three rea-
sons. 249 First, they argued that the testing program was
not a minimal intrusion and therefore could not be evalu-
ated under the "special needs" exception.25 ° Second, the
plaintiffs alleged that the testing program called for an
impermissibly high degree of employer discretion. 25' Fi-
nally, they contended that the government's "special
need" did not require random or unannounced testing.252
The basis for the first challege centered on the distinc-
tions between the FAA program and FRA and Customs
Service programs upheld in Skinner and Von Raab H. The
plaintiffs argued that the FAA program was not a minimal
intrusion because it called for continuing, random, unan-
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 409-93 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
supra notes 240-241.
2r, See DiNunno, supra note 16, at 11.
2W, Id.
247 Brief for Petitioners at 1, Bluestein v. Skinner, No. 88-7503 (9th Cir. argued
Sept. 15, 1989).
248 Id.
249 Petitioners Reply Brief at 1, 11, 15, Bluestein.
254 Id. at 1-11.
251 Id. at 12-15.
-,2 Id. at 15-22.
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nounced testing of covered employees.253 Relying on the
Supreme Court's statement that suspicionless testing can
not be valid unless the "privacy interests implicated ...
are minimal, '2 54 the unions contended that the cited dif-
ferences in the FAA program precluded its being consid-
ered minimally intrusive.255 Therefore, they argued that
the random testing component of the program could not
be evaluated under the "special needs" analysis and
should be held invalid. 56
Citing New Jersey v. T. L. 0., the plaintiffs argued that sus-
picionless testing is invalid if the employee's expectations
of privacy are subject to the discretion of the employer.
Four areas in which employers retained potentially abu-
sive levels of discretion were addressed. 257 Two of these
issues were related to the time and place of testing. The
unions contended there were no limits on the timing of
tests or the physical surroundings in which samples must
be submitted.258 The union also noted that an employer
was not required to state whether the test being adminis-
tered was the result of random selection or was being ad-
ministered because the employee was suspected of drug
use. 259 The final complaint was that because the program
did not specify whether testing should be done individu-
ally or in groups, the potential for abuse by singling out
individuals was significant.2 60
The third challenge to the FAA program questioned the
need for random testing when the program also provided
2-53 Id. at 2. The petitioners noted that the testing is not triggered by an identifi-
able event, that it requires a "continuing regime of repeated testing" and that all
tests must be unannounced. Id.
25- Id. at 1 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Exectutives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 1417 (1989)).
21.1 Reply Brief at 2, Bluestein.
-, Id. at 2. This point follows the Supreme Court's discussion in Skinner, which
stated that where minimal privacy interests were balanced against a significant
government interest, suspicionless searches could be reasonable. Skinner, 109 S.
Ct. at 1417.





for periodic, post-accident and for-cause testing. 26 1 The
plaintiffs' argument noted the lack of evidence of drug use
in the industry.262 The union argued that each element of
the testing program must satisfy the "special needs" anal-
ysis. Where the vast majority of the government's "need"
is satisfied by the less intrusive components of the pro-
gram, the incremental benefit achieved through addi-
tional random testing can not justify the increased
intrusion into the employees' privacy.263
VI. CONCLUSION
As this comment goes to press the Ninth Circuit has not
issued a decision in the Bluestein case. Several major com-
mercial carriers initiated their testing programs in Decem-
ber, 1989.264 The Bluestein plaintiffs requested a stay of
these tests pending the Ninth Circuit's decision, however,
the court denied their motion.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the FAA program and
any subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, must con-
sider several factors in determining whether the govern-
ment's "special needs" justify the intrusiveness of random
urine testing. Although the factors indicating the
searches are an unreasonable intrusion appear more nu-
merous, this does not necessarily mean that they should
be given more weight in the "special needs" balancing
test.
26 5
The most significant factors supporting the aviation em-
ployees' position are the increased intrusiveness of ran-
'- I d. at 15-16.
2-1 W Id. at 16-19; see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
2-;:, Reply Brief at 16, Bluestein.
264 DiNunno, supra note 16 at 10-11. Testing plans submitted by United Air-
lines and American Airlines were approved by the FAA. These airlines were
scheduled to begin testing Dec. 18, 1989. Id. at 11.
2-, The only discussion of the appropriate weight to be given the various factors
was made by the D.C. Circuit in Cheney. The court suggested that risks involved in
aviation made testing reasonable by definition. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v.
Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see supra notes 236-239 and accompa-
nying text.
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dom testing,266 the virtual absence of evidence suggesting
a drug problem in the aviation industry,26 7 the lack of em-
ployee discretion,2 68 and the absence of any mandated re-
habilitation programs.26 9 Somewhat less significant issues
include: The employees' status as private sector work-
ers;270 the absence of testing for alcohol or prescription
drugs; 27' the presence of periodic and for-cause testing;272
and the validity of the deterrent effect of the tests, given
the natural deterrent effect of the employees' fear of in-
jury or death due to drug impairment.27 3
The impact of random testing on the "special needs"
evaluation is addressed by the D.C. Circuit in Cheney.274
Although that court held it is merely a factor to be consid-
ered, the case addressed testing of government employ-
ees, not private section workers.2 75 Von Raab II holds that
evidence of drug use is not a requirement for a finding
that testing is reasonable. The decision, however, ad-
dresses employees involved in drug interdiction, and does
not involve random testing.276 Finally, all of the cases
which have found urine testing programs reasonable in
the absence of individualized suspicion have either per-
mitted employees to avoid testing or in case of employees
who failed tests provided for rehabilitation or transfer to
" See supra notes 253-256 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue
in Bluestein v. Skinner, No. 887503 (9th Cir. argued Sept. 15, 1989).
,'7 See supra note 190 and accompanying text, comparing the history of alcohol
abuse in the railroad industry to the lack of evidence of drug abuse in aviation; but
see notes 219-220 and accompanying text, discussing the lack of evidence of drug
use among customs employees.
"" See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
2-" See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
27,, See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text; see also notes 261-263 and
accompanying text.
-.71 See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text; see also note 214 and accom-
panying text. This issue was addressed by the dissents in both Skinner and Von
Raab I. Id.
2,.1 See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
2.75 See supra note 227.
27, See supra note 209 and accompanying text. The absence of this nexus re-
quirement was given as justification for holding drug testing unreasonable in Che-
ney. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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less sensitive positions.277
Balanced against these factors are several factors sup-
porting the government's significant interest in testing
aviation workers. Clearly the most significant is the po-
tential for harm resulting from drug impaired employ-
ees. 27 A second factor is the enhanced deterrent effect of
random testing as opposed to periodic and for-cause
tests.2 7 9 Finally, aviation industry employees are presently
subject to significant regulation.2 80 This factor reduces
their reasonable expectations of privacy and may result in
a finding that random drug testing is not unreasonable in
light of the strong government interest in public safety.28'
On the basis of the arguments made in the majority and
dissenting opinions in Skinner and Von Raab II, the author
feels that the inclusion of random urine testing in the FAA
program is an unreasonable intrusion into the reasonable
privacy expectations of employees. However, given the
current national fervor, and the apparent belief that
greater regulation is the solution to our current drug
problem, the author is not optimistic that this opinion will
prevail.
'-77 See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603, 606 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Hormon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 826 F.2d. 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1987) affrd
in part, vacated in part and remanded 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
27. See supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
27.. FR, Anti-Drug Program, supra note 4, at 47,035-38 (FAA Response to Com-
ments on Random Testing).
2... See supra note 223, see also supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
2'- Id.
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